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PACE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MOOT 
COURT COMPETITION  
 




This is a suit brought by Friends of Responsible Trade (FRT) 
and two of its members, Ace Ventura and Juan Valdez, against 
the Green Recycling Group, Inc. and the Newtown Parent 
Teachers Association (together appellees, GRG, or Newtown 
PTA).  The complaint alleges violations of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (RCRA), 
by the export of used electronic devices (UEDs) in violation of 
RCRA requirements pertaining to the disposal of hazardous 
waste. The United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has intervened. 
The action at issue in this case involves GRG’s export of 
UEDs from the United States to Sud-Americano, a developing 
country, for purposes of salvage and recycling. GRG is in the 
business of collecting UEDs for sale to foreign salvagers and 
recyclers.  R4.1 It collects these materials by entering into 
partnerships with community organizations, such as Newtown 
PTA, who in turn solicit UEDs from neighborhood households. 
R4. GRG requires anyone seeking free collection of UEDs to 
execute a form acknowledging that the particular devices 
collected were owned by them and used in their households.  R4.  
After collecting sufficient UEDs to fill a shipping container, GRG 
 
* This Bench Brief was authored by Hana Heineken, J.D. Candidate 2010, 
Pace Law School, and assisted by Sean T. Dixon, J.D., M.E.M.; LL.M. 
(Environmental Law—Climate Change Track) 2010 Candidate, Pace Law 
School.  Please note that the Summary of Conclusions section of the original 
brief has been omitted for ease of readership.  
1.“R” refers to the Record in this case. 
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ships the container to a salvage and recycling company abroad to 
salvage still useable UEDs and components and to reclaim 
precious metals and plastics from the remaining unusable UEDs. 
R4. 
On June 19, 2008, Newtown PTA solicited members of local 
households in the town of Newtown, State of New Union, to bring 
their UEDs to the parking lot of Newtown High School for 
recycling purposes.  R5. Newtown PTA told the residents that 
their devices would either be reused or recycled to put their 
components to good use.  R5.  GRG supplied the shipping 
container for the UEDs, container #VS2078, and Newtown PTA’s 
members supervised the collection of the materials.  R5.  The 
Newtown PTA members placed devices in the container only after 
a visual examination showed that all of the UEDs were intact and 
after residents signed a form, supplied by GRG, acknowledging 
that the particular devices collected were owned by them, used in 
their households, remained intact, and were being disposed for 
purposes of reuse or recycling. R5.  A significant number of the 
UEDs were MyPhones, a larger, less versatile version of the 
Apple iPhone.  R5.  Unlike the iPhone, MyPhones use a mercury-
lithium battery and contain more lead and other toxic materials, 
albeit in small quantities. R5, SR.2 
FRT member Ventura, a freelance photojournalist and citizen 
of the United States, photographed many of the UEDs that 
Newtown PTA’s members placed in container simply labeled 
#VS2078 in the Newtown PTA High School Parking lot on June 
19, 2008.  R5, SR. Ventura ascertained that container #VS2078 
was entirely filled with material collected at Newtown PTA on 
two successive Saturdays and was sent by GRG a week later to 
Geraldo Garcia, in the city of Pacifica, located in the nation of 
Sud-Americano.  Sud-Americano is a party to the Basel 
Convention but is not a member of the OECD.  SR.  It has no 
regulatory scheme governing the recycling of UEDs or the 
pollution resulting from such activities. R5. No paperwork, aside 
from generic customs documents, was used by GRG in its export 
to Sud-Americano. R5.  FRT is a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) 
membership organization that advocates for responsible trade 
practices on behalf of its members. SR. 
 
2.“SR” refers to the Supplemental Record derived from the NELMCC Q&A. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/10
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Upon receiving container #VS2078, Garcia sorted the UEDs 
and their components in order to separate out those still useful in 
the Sud-Americano market.  R5.  Garcia, who only operates in 
Pacifica, had been conducting these operations over a period of six 
years prior to receipt of #VS2078.  R5, SR.  Garcia hired local 
residents, including FRT member Juan Valdez, to reclaim heavy 
metals and other valuable materials from the remaining 
unusable UEDs.  R5.  Valdez has worked in Garcia’s operations 
from their inception.  R6.  Because Garcia failed to supply his 
workers with protective devices, such as gloves and masks, or 
equipment designed for safe removal of materials from the UEDs, 
the workers, including Valdez, have been directly exposed to 
mercury, lead, cadmium, chromium, and other toxic materials, 
endangering their health. R6.  In addition, because Garcia failed 
to properly collect, contain and manage waste from his 
operations, mercury, lead, and other heavy materials have 
entered into the water and land of the local environment, further 
endangering local inhabitants (including FRT member Valdez) 
and potentially endangering anyone encountering the local 
environment (including FRT member Ventura, who visited the 
area during the making of a documentary). R6. 
Ventura made a documentary film of the activities of GRG, 
Newtown PTA, and Garcia, highlighting the exposure of Valdez 
and other workers and residents to the toxic materials sourced in 
recycling UEDs supplied by GRG and others, and the injuries 
possibly caused by those exposures.  R6. Ventura’s film, “Toxic 
Recycling,” was awarded prizes for the best documentary film at 
three different film festivals, aired on public television, and 
earned a net profit of over $100,000 for Ventura.  R6. 
FRT and two of its members, Ace Ventura and Juan Valdez, 
brought this suit under RCRA’s citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(1)(A), with all notice obligations fulfilled, alleging that 
GRG and Newtown PTA violated RCRA by exporting UEDs in 
violation of RCRA requirements pertaining to the disposal of 
hazardous waste.  SR. FRT and its two members seek civil 
penalties for the violations, an injunction against further 
violations of RCRA, and compensatory damages for injuries 
suffered by the two members as a result of the violations.  R3.  
FRT member Valdez (as a citizen of Sud-Americano) also bases 
3
NELMCC BENCH BRIEF 2010   
848 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27   
jurisdiction for his claim for personal injury on the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (ATCA).  R3. 
EPA filed a motion to intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(d). R3. 
After full discovery, FRT, joined by the United States, filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment against GRG and Newtown 
PTA, asking the District Court to find that GRG and Newtown 
PTA had violated RCRA and to leave the remedial portion of this 
action for disposition after trial.  R3. 
Thereafter, GRG and Newtown PTA filed a countermotion in 
the District Court for summary judgment against FRT and EPA, 
asking for a ruling either (1) that the District Court has no 
jurisdiction to entertain the action by FRT and its members (and 
that EPA would then be prevented from carrying on litigation 
without the original parties) or (2) that GRG and Newtown PTA 
have not violated RCRA.  R4. 
 
In its Order of August 31, 2009, the District Court: 
 
1) Held, that FRT and its members lack constitutional standing 
to bring this case. FRT’s argument for representational 
standing fails because neither of its individual members has 
constitutional standing: FRT member Ventura had no injury 
in fact that is fairly traceable to GRG’s action, and FRT 
member Valdez had no proof that his injuries were caused by 
GRG and Newtown PTA. 
 
2) Held, that FRT and its members lack statutory standing to 
sue GRG and Newtown PTA for RCRA violations. FRT and 
its members lack statutory standing under RCRA because 
there is no ongoing violation by GRG and Newtown PTA, 
plaintiff Valdez is not a citizen of the United States, and the 
harms suffered by the plaintiffs were caused by the actions of 
a negligent recycling factory operator, Garcia, instead of the 
actions of defendants. If GRG and Newtown PTA violated 
RCRA, they did so in the United States, but their activities in 
the United States did not cause the injuries claimed by the 
plaintiffs. 
 
3) Held, that FRT member Valdez has constitutional standing 
to proceed with his ATCA claim against GRG and Newtown 
PTA for personal injury, but this Court does not have 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/10
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jurisdiction to hear the ATCA claim. Plaintiff does not have 
ATCA jurisdiction because the tortious action allegedly 
responsible for his injury was not “committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350. 
 
4) Held, that despite plaintiff’s lack of standing to continue the 
litigation, EPA as intervenor has proper basis to continue the 
litigation.  Because the issue of RCRA violation falls within 
the direct purview of EPA agency authority and EPA has 
shown that it has independent ability to enforce RCRA 
against GRG and Newtown PTA, EPA has sufficient interest, 
basis, and standing to continue the suit absent the original 
plaintiffs. 
 
5) Held, that plaintiffs did not violate the RCRA provisions 
pertaining to the export of hazardous waste because the 
waste collected by GRG and Newtown PTA was exempt from 
the hazardous waste classification due to its household 
nature. The waste collected constituted solid waste under 
RCRA jurisdiction while the container was in the United 
States, but once the materials left the United States, they 
were neither solid waste nor hazardous waste for the 
purposes of RCRA applicability to Garcia’s operations. 
 
Following the issuance of the District Court’s Order, all 
parties filed Notices of Appeal with the Court of Appeals for the 
Twelfth Circuit. 
 
The parties are directed to brief the following issues: 
 
1) Whether Appellant FRT has sufficient constitutional or 
statutory standing to bring any action against GRG and 
Newtown PTA for violations resulting from the export of 
container #VS2078 to Geraldo Garcia’s recycling plant. (GRG 
and Newtown PTA argue that FRT and its members have no 
standing to sue over the exported materials; FRT argues that 
there is standing under ATCA and RCRA; EPA argues that 
RCRA applies but ATCA does not). 
 
2) Whether the ATCA provides an alternate basis for FRT’s 
standing. (GRG and Newtown PTA argue that the court 
properly dismissed the applicability of the statute; EPA 
5
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argues that, as a matter of policy, its regulations are 
sufficient to protect the interests of foreign citizens and that 
expansion of ATCA claims would be an impediment to the 
administrative process; FRT argues that the international 
custom and Congressional action on the issue supports a 
claim of jurisdiction under ATCA). 
 
3) Whether a dismissal of the suit as between FRT and GRG 
and Newtown PTA (the original parties) ends the action with 
respect to the intervenor EPA’s claims.  (GRG and Newtown 
PTA argue that it does as EPA can bring its own enforcement 
actions at any time; EPA argues that justice would best be 
served by allowing the action to continue with EPA as a 
party and that EPA has an independent, jurisdictional basis 
for its involvement in the action; FRT agrees that in the 
interests of justice, if its case is dismissed, EPA should still 
be allowed to continue litigation in order to resolve the 
situation at hand). 
 
4) Whether the lower court properly analyzed the facts in terms 
of the solid waste nature of the exported materials, and, 
whether the export of container #VS2078 in the manner 
described subjects GRG and Newtown PTA to RCRA liability.  
(GRG and Newtown PTA argue that they are not subject to 
RCRA liability as their goods cease to be “solid waste” once 
they are sent outside the United States for recycling; FRT 
and EPA argue that RCRA nonetheless applies to the 
exported waste). 
 
5) Whether the materials exported are considered hazardous for 
the purposes of RCRA; and, therefore, whether GRG and 
Newtown PTA are liable for violating the testing and 
reporting provisions of RCRA’s hazardous waste sections. 
(GRG and Newtown PTA argue that the materials in 
container #VS2078 are not hazardous as defined under 
RCRA; EPA and FRT argue that because no exceptions apply 
and these types of materials are known to be toxic, the 
materials are hazardous for the purposes of RCRA). 
 
This bench brief discusses each of these five issues in turn, 
outlining the positions of the parties and the applicable law.  
Sample questions for the oralists are presented for each issue. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/10
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is traditionally divided into three 
categories of “questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of 
fact (reviewable for clear error), and matters of discretion 
(reviewable for “abuse of discretion”).” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 
U.S. 552, 558 (1988). 
A District Court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary 
judgment is reviewed de novo, using the same standard as that 
applied by the district court.  Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 578 
F.3d 279, 290 (5th Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is proper “if 
the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and 
any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material 
fact exists when there are “disputes over facts that might affect 
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating the 
evidence, the court must draw all inferences in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “The mere existence 
of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] 
position will be insufficient [to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment]; there must be evidence on which the jury could 
reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. 
at 252. 
The Court of Appeals determines de novo whether plaintiffs 
have standing under Article III to proceed to the merits of their 
lawsuit. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 
1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000). For review of the ATCA and RCRA 
statutory standing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted 
that the court should only “set aside findings of fact only when 
they are clearly erroneous” but that there is “de novo [review of] 
the district court’s conclusions of law and its resolution of mixed 
questions of law and fact.”  Phansalkar v. Anderson Weinroth & 
Com, L.P., 344 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 
7
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ISSUE I: Constitutional or RCRA Statutory Standing 
Whether Appellant FRT has sufficient constitutional or 
RCRA statutory standing to bring any action against GRG and 
Newtown PTA for violations resulting from the export of 
container #VS2078 to Geraldo Garcia’s recycling plant. 
 
A. Positions of the Parties 
Appellees GRG and Newtown PTA argue that FRT 
has no standing. 
Appellant FRT argues that it has standing. 




FRT’s claim for constitutional standing is based on theories 
of representational standing as outlined in Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727 (1972). R6. FRT asserts representational standing 
based on two contentions: (1) because its member, Juan Valdez, 
was injured by exposure to mercury, lead and other substances 
from GRG’s and Newtown PTA’s activities violating RCRA and 
(2) because its member Ace Ventura, was exposed to and injured 
by the same substances while filming in Pacifica and is afraid to 
return to Pacifica because he would suffer further exposure to 
toxic contamination. R6.  In this regard, Valdez and Ventura 
claim standing on the same basis: the environmental degradation 
and pollution resulting from GRG and Newtown PTA’s export 
activities. R6. 
FRT will also argue that it has statutory standing under the 
citizen suit provision of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972. 
The District Court determined that FRT and its members 
have neither constitutional nor statutory standing to sue GRG 
and Newtown PTA.  The Court determined that FRT lacked 
constitutional standing because it failed to establish the merits of 
representational standing.  R6.  The Court found that neither of 
its members, Valdez nor Ventura, had made the requisite 
showing of suffering an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to 
the alleged violation and which is redressable by the court.  R6.  
It also found that FRT had no RCRA standing on grounds that 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/10
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there was no ongoing violation, FRT member Valdez was not a 
US citizen, and the harm suffered was caused by the activities of 
a negligent recycling operator, Garcia.  R7. 
Overview of Constitutional Standing 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal court 
jurisdiction to deciding ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’  U.S. Const. 
Art. III, 2, cl. 1.  Because the constitutional standing doctrine 
stems directly from Article III’s ‘case or controversy’ requirement, 
a plaintiff’s constitutional standing must be determined as a 
threshold matter in order to establish the jurisdiction of the 
Court to hear the case and reach its merits.  Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-96, 104 (1998). In order to have 
Article III standing, FRT must satisfy the three elements 
established by the Supreme Court as the “irreducible 
constitutional minimum” for standing.  Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  R6.  First, the plaintiff must 
suffer an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally-protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 
imminent.” Id.  Second, the injury must be “fairly traceable” to 
the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the 
“independent action of some third party not before the court.”  Id.  
Third, the injury must be redressable, that is, it must be “likely” 
rather than merely “speculative” that the injury will be 
“redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561. The party invoking 
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these 
elements. Id. However, “[a] suit will not be dismissed for lack of 
standing if there are sufficient ‘allegations of fact’—not proof—in 
the complaint or supporting affidavits.” Gwaltney of Smithfield v. 
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 65 (1987). 
Analysis of FRT’s Constitutional Standing 
1) Injury-in-Fact 
The issue presented here is whether the injuries suffered by 
Juan Valdez and Ace Ventura qualify as “injury-in-fact.” In 
environmental cases, the requisite injury for Article III standing 
purposes is not necessarily injury to the environment but injury 
to the plaintiff. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 
9
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(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 182 (2000). The injury must be 
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.  For an injury to be 
“particularized,” the injury “must affect the plaintiff in a personal 
and individual way.”  Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561. The 
plaintiff cannot be merely a “concerned bystander.” See Valley 
Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982).  The plaintiff must also 
point to a cognizable harm. Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 
F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2004). The requirement is satisfied if 
the plaintiff has an economic, aesthetic, or recreational interest in 
the particular place and that interest will be impaired by the 
defendant’s conduct. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183. 
Additionally, the injury must be “actual or imminent.” 
Speculative or conjectural injuries do not satisfy this 
requirement. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 (holding that 
plaintiff members’ “some-day” intentions to return to the habitats 
of certain endangered species were not enough to show that 
damage to the species’ habitat would produce imminent injury to 
themselves. Intentions must be concrete plans to support a 
finding of actual or imminent injury). The potential threat of 
future harm or injury is sufficient to meet this requirement.  See 
Opposing Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that a citizens group representing persons 
living close to the landfill, which had at least the potential to 
injure them, was constitutionally permitted to litigate to enforce 
RCRA). See also Mass. v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) 
(holding that EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both “actual” 
and “imminent”).  Even a small probability of injury is sufficient 
to create a case or controversy so long as the relief sought, if 
granted, would reduce the probability. Vill. of Elk Grove v. Evans, 
997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993).  Where a plaintiff seeks 
prospective injunctive relief, it must demonstrate a “real and 
immediate threat” of future injury in order to satisfy the “injury 
in fact” requirement. Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast 
Transit Authority, 344 F.3d 1263, 1272 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1983)). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/10
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FRT’s Argument 
FRT will argue that it has standing on grounds that both 
Valdez and Ventura suffered an injury-in-fact. FRT will argue 
that Valdez clearly suffered a “concrete and particularized” and 
“actual” injury.  Expert medical deposition testimony established 
that Valdez suffers from memory and neurological losses “of the 
type caused by lead and mercury poisoning.”  R6.  Garcia’s 
workers, including Valdez, were directly exposed to mercury, 
lead, cadmium and other toxic materials, endangering their 
health.  R5-6.  In addition, because Garcia failed to properly 
collect, contain, and manage waste from the operations, mercury, 
lead, and other heavy metals entered into the water and land of 
the local environment, further endangering local inhabitants 
including Valdez.  R6. The fact that the injury occurred overseas 
does not negate the existence of an “injury-in-fact.” See Whaling 
Assn. v. Am. Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (injury-
in-fact established for American whale watchers from Japanese 
whaling activities). 
FRT will argue that Ventura was exposed to and injured by 
the same substances as Valdez while filming in Pacifica and is 
afraid to return for fear of exposure.  R6.  In contrast to Valdez, 
Ventura has no present physical manifestations from exposure to 
toxic material, R6, and alleged no particular physical injury from 
such exposure.  R7. However, Ventura testified that because he 
was so emotionally upset by seeing the pollution and the workers, 
such as Valdez, who were ‘obviously’ injured by such pollution, he 
was afraid to return.  R7.  Here, Ventura must prove the 
elements set out in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, that the injury 
is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent.’ 
Plaintiffs can have standing to sue without actual injury, 
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 169 (2000) (holding that plaintiffs can be 
‘injured’ by reasonable perceptions of danger, even though the 
violations do not injure the environment).  Ventura’s potential 
injury from the exposure is defensible without scientific proof if 
he can show a direct nexus between his injury and the area of 
environmental impairment. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston 
Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 159 (4th Cir. 2000) (en 
banc) (citing Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th 
Cir. 1996) which held that citizens’ concern about water quality 
and fear that it will impair their enjoyment of recreational 
11
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activities in the bay sufficed as injury-in-fact). Threats or 
increased risk can constitute cognizable harm. Gaston Copper 
Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d at 160  (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 
472). 
The lower court found the injury-in-fact element satisfied 
with respect to Valdez, and this court should affirm.  However, 
Ventura’s injury from his fear of return cannot suffice as an 
injury-in-fact if Ventura is merely a “concerned bystander.” 
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
Justice Scalia required the plaintiff to show that an injury to that 
cognizable interest be proven and that the plaintiff be himself 
among the injured. The lower court found that Ventura had not 
been injured by the sights in Pacifica but rather had benefited 
from them. However, “the fact that an injury may be outweighed 
by other benefits, while often sufficient to defeat a claim for 
damages, does not negate standing.” Denney v. Deutsche Bank 
AG, 443 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 2006).  If Ventura can show a 
cognizable interest in Pacifica, concrete plans to return to 
Pacifica, and refusal to do so because of his fear of exposure, he 
may claim an injury-in-fact that passes the test laid out in Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife. 
 
2) ‘Fairly Traceable’ Causation 
The ‘fairly traceable’ requirement for causation ensures that 
the injury was in fact caused by the alleged action. This 
requirement “does not mean that plaintiffs must show to a 
scientific certainty” that defendant alone “caused the precise 
harm suffered by the plaintiffs.”  Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 n.7 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Public 
Interest Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990)).  It is not the same 
requirement as in tort causation. Friends for Ferrell Parkway, 
LLC v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 324 (4th Cir. 2002).  However, it 
requires proof of a substantial likelihood that the defendant’s 
conduct caused plaintiff’s injury in fact.  Nova Health Systems v. 
Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations and 
citations omitted.)  Where the injury was caused by the 
independent action of a third party, the Supreme Court has held 
that it does not meet the ‘fairly traceable’ requirement. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/10
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Courts have found the injury to be ‘fairly traceable’ where it 
was produced by determinative or coercive effect upon the 
defendant’s action of someone else.  See Bennett v. Spear, 520 
U.S. 154, 168-169 (1997) (holding that the injury was fairly 
traceable to the defendant agency’s actions where the defendant 
had some “determinative or coercive” effect upon the actions of a 
third party agency who was responsible for the plaintiff’s injury.  
See also Tozzi v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 
301, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting tort standard of causation: 
“[w]hen, as here, the alleged injury flows not directly from the 
challenged agency action, but rather from independent actions of 
third parties, we have required only a showing that the agency 
action is at least a substantial factor motivating the third parties’ 
actions.”).  The issue presented here is whether there was a 
substantial likelihood that defendant’s conduct caused the 
plaintiffs’ injuries. 
FRT’s Argument 
FRT will argue that the ‘fairly traceable’ requirement is met 
because the appellees’ actions were a substantial factor 
motivating Garcia’s actions.  Alternatively, FRT may argue that 
Garcia was an agent of the defendant, and therefore its actions 
are attributable to the appellees. 
Based on the case law and the facts, the fairly traceable 
requirement for causation will continue to present a difficult 
obstacle for appellants in proving constitutional standing. As the 
facts show, Garcia runs an independent salvage and recycling 
company with customers other than GRG.  R5.  Injuries to both 
Valdez and Ventura were directly caused by Garcia’s negligence 
in operating the recycling activities. R5-6. There is no evidence 
that GRG’s actions had a substantial effect on GRG’s actions to 
negligently handle the shipment. The lower court found Valdez 
had failed to demonstrate that his injuries were fairly traceable 
to the complained-of action, as there was no evidence that his 
injuries were actually caused by lead and mercury poisoning nor 
that they were caused by lead and mercury from material in 
appellees’ container.  R6. The lower court also found that 
causation was lacking because it was Garcia’s negligence that 
exposed Valdez to lead and mercury, not the collection and 
shipment of material by the appellees.  R7.  The lower court held 
13
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that the activities of GRG and Newtown PTA in the United 
States did not cause Valdez or Ventura’s exposures to lead and 
mercury in Pacifica.  R8.  This court should affirm. 
 
3) Redressability 
Redressability requires that it is likely, as opposed to 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.  “A plaintiff 
satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a 
favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself.  He 
need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every 
injury.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 225, n.15 (1982) (cited 
favorably in Mass. v. EPA, 547 U.S. 497, 525). 
The question presented here is whether the relief sought will 
redress the plaintiffs’ injuries. 
FRT’s Argument 
FRT will argue that the relief sought—civil penalties for the 
violations, an injunction against further violations of RCRA, and 
compensatory damages for injuries suffered by the two members 
as a result of the violations—satisfies the redressability 
requirement. 
The lower court did not rule on whether this element is 
satisfied, having found that the other elements of standing were 
not met.  However, it may be argued that none of the remedies 
requested will redress the appellants’ injuries.  Since both the 
civil penalties and the injunction will be directed toward GRG 
and Newtown PTA rather than toward Garcia, such measures 
will not stop further injury to the appellants unless the enjoining 
of appellees’ activities will also put a stop to Garcia’s dangerous 
recycling activities. Furthermore, civil penalties under RCRA are 
payable to the U.S. Treasury under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g), and 
therefore they will not compensate the appellants for their 
injuries. On the other hand, compensatory damages may redress 
the appellants’ injuries by helping to cover treatment costs or lost 
wages, but such private actions for damages are not permitted 
under RCRA citizen suits.  R7.  See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource 
Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985). While Valdez’ citizen 
suit claim may be susceptible to a claim for personal injury by 
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way of pendant jurisdiction, the lower court has explained that 
that is not the case here.  Instead, the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (ATCA) governs jurisdiction over such actions and 
does not grant jurisdiction to entertain such actions. R7. 
Compensatory damages for personal injury may be 
permissible for an action under the ATCA brought by Valdez 
(discussed below).  R8. However, if Valdez continues to work for 
Garcia and Garcia’s operations continue to harm its workers and 
pollute the surrounding environment, Valdez’s injuries will not be 
abated, and therefore the redressability requirement will not be 
met. 
Overview of Representational Standing 
An association may have standing to sue in federal courts 
based either on an injury to the organization in its own right or 
as the representative of its members who have been harmed. 
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d at 155.  This case is 
only concerned with the latter.  R6.  For a group to have standing 
on behalf of its members, it must show that: (1) at least one 
member would have standing to sue; (2) interests of the 
organization are germane to the subject matter of the suit; and 
(3) neither the claim nor the relief requires the participation of 
the individual members in the litigation. R6. Hunt v. Washington 
State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (holding that Sierra 
Club lacked standing to enjoin the federal government’s 
allowance of a skiing development proposed by the Disney 
Company for the Mineral King Valley, because it failed to allege 
that it or its members would suffer an injury to a cognizable 
interest). 
The lower court found that FRT’s representational argument 
failed because it rested upon the standing of Valdez and Ventura 
and neither had constitutional standing to bring this case.  R7.  
As shown in the analysis above, the plaintiff’s satisfaction of the 
three prongs for constitutional standing is tenuous.  If FRT fails 
to argue that either Ventura or Valdez has standing, it will not be 
able to bring this case on the basis of representational standing. 
15
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Overview of Statutory RCRA Standing 
Standing rests on three grounds: Constitutional standing 
(discussed above); statutory standing, by which Congress 
establishes statutory limitations on who may access the federal 
courts; and judicially imposed prudential standing.  In addition to 
meeting the constitutional requirements, the plaintiff must 
satisfy judicially imposed prudential limitations.  Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (stating that standing “involves 
both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and 
prudential limitations on its exercise”). In order to satisfy 
statutory standing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that its claim 
falls within the “zone of interests” protected by the statute in 
question.  See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982). 
“Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who 
otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.” Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).  Courts have held that the use 
of the term “any person” in environmental laws such as RCRA 
and CERCLA implies that Congress intended to confer standing 
to the full extent permitted by Article III and therefore abrogated 
the prudential standing requirements under these statutes. DMJ 
Associates, L.L.C. v. Capasso, 288 F.Supp.2d 262, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
The appellants brought this action under RCRA citizen suit 
provision 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A)(1998), which states that: 
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own 
behalf—against any person (including (a) the United 
States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or 
agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh 
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in 
violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, 
requirement, prohibition, or order which has become 
effective pursuant to this chapter. (Emphasis added) 
The issue here is whether the appellants’ claims fall within 
the “zone of interest” protected by 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/10
NELMCC BENCH BRIEF 2010   
2010] NELMCC JUDGES’ EDITION MEMORANDUM 861 
 Analysis of FRT’s RCRA Standing 
GRG and Newtown PTA’s Argument 
GRG and Newtown PTA will argue that RCRA does not allow 
noncitizens, such as Valdez, to bring citizen suits.  Under RCRA, 
the term “person” means “an individual, trust, firm, joint stock 
company, corporation, partnership, association, State, 
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any 
interstate body and shall include each department, agency, and 
instrumentality of the United States.”  42 U.S.C. § 6903(15). The 
citizen suit provision states that the district court “shall have 
jurisdiction . . . to enforce the permit, standard, regulation, 
condition, requirement, prohibition, or order, referred to in 
paragraph (1)(A)” “without regard to . . . the citizenship of the 
parties.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).  However, it does not explicitly 
confer to noncitizens the right to bring a citizen suit.  GRG will 
argue that the section heading of 42 U.S.C. § 6972 is “Citizen 
Suits,” and where the statute is ambiguous, as it is here in its 
application to noncitizens, “they are [. . .] tools available for the 
resolution of a doubt.” Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. 
Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529 (1947). As the heading indicates, only 
“citizens” can sue under 42 U.S.C. § 6972. 
GRG and Newtown PTA will also argue that a citizen suit 
would not be allowed in this case because it would require the 
extraterritorial application of RCRA.  There is a presumption 
against extraterritorial application of laws; in order to apply 
RCRA beyond the borders of the United States, Congressional 
intent to do so must be clearly stated.  Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 
336 U.S. 281 (1949).  In Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., the 
Court addressed whether RCRA’s citizen suit provision for 
“imminent and substantial endangerment,” 42 U.S.C. 
6972(a)(1)(B), applies to hazardous waste located overseas. 775 
F.Supp. 668, 674 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The Amlon Court dismissed 
the case upon finding “considerable legislative history supporting 
the view that Congress intended an entirely domestic focus for 
RCRA’s citizen suit provision.” Id.  Appellees will argue that 
where Congress intended to allow a foreign claimant, they 
explicitly included that in the statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 9611(l), and 
this is not the case here. 
17
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FRT’s Argument 
FRT will argue that it satisfies the definition of a “person” 
because “person” has been interpreted to include an organization 
and FRT is an organization. See Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of 
Buffalo, N.Y. and Vicinity v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d 138 
(2d Cir. 2006) (labor organization). FRT will argue that this is not 
undermined by the presence of a noncitizen in the suit, and that, 
in its view, Ventura’s and FRT’s (representational) standing is 
sufficient to defeat an extraterritoriality claim.  See Dugong v. 
Gates, 543 F.Supp.2d 1082 (N.D.Cal. 2008) (plaintiffs consisting 
of Japanese and American parties).  FRT will also point out that 
headings and titles “cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” 
Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 331 U.S. at 528–29. Valdez is a “person.” 
The Supreme Court has held that “any person” should be taken at 
face value.  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997).  
Appellants are therefore qualified to bring a citizen suit and the 
lower court erred in limiting such authority to citizens.  R7.  If, 
however, FRT’s only basis for standing is representational 
standing based on the injury to Valdez (and if Ventura’s claim is 
dismissed as being without standing), it is unclear whether 
appellants’ claim will still satisfy the RCRA citizen suit 
requirements. 
FRT will also argue that this case is distinguishable from 
Amlon in that the citizen suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(1)(A).  FRT will also argue that the alleged RCRA 
violation, namely a violation of RCRA’s regulations governing 
paperwork pertaining to the export of hazardous waste, occurred 
domestically, and therefore the issue of extraterritoriality does 
not apply.  See Lisa T. Belenkey, Cradle to Border: US Hazardous 
Waste Export Regulations and International Law, 17 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 95, 116 (1999) (stating that even if citizen suits are 
limited to domestic issues, that limitation should not categorically 
bar a citizen suit under RCRA § 3017 (Export of Hazardous 
Wastes) because the actual violation of § 3017 export 
requirements occurs domestically).  The lower court found this to 
be true—if GRG and Newtown PTA violated RCRA, they did so in 
the United States.  R8. 
Lastly, a RCRA citizen suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(1)(A) requires the defendant “to be in violation.”  The 
Supreme Court in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake 
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Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) held that “[t]he most natural 
reading of ‘to be in violation’ is a requirement that citizen-
plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or intermittent 
violation—that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will 
continue to pollute in the future. Congress could have phrased its 
requirement in language that looked to the past (‘to have 
violated’), but it did not choose this readily available option.” Id. 
at 57. The Gwaltney court’s interpretation has been applied to 
cases brought under RCRA. See Bd. of County Comm’rs of County 
of La Plata, Colo. v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 598 F.Supp.2d 
1185 (D.Colo. 2009).  The Supreme Court went on to state that in 
adding a civil remedy under Section 6972(a)(1)(B), “Congress has 
demonstrated . . . that it knows how to avoid this prospective 
implication by using language that explicitly targets wholly past 
violations.” See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57. 
The violation here occurred in 2008 and involved one 
shipment of one container (container #VS2078).  R8.  FRT alleges 
that GRG sent other containers of similar material abroad for 
recycling and will do so again.  R8.  It did not make such 
allegations with regard to Newtown PTA, and as far as Newtown 
PTA is concerned, this was a one-time, isolated activity.  R8.  
GRG has admitted that it exported containers of similar material 
for salvage and recycling, though this was the first export to Sud-
Americano.  R8.  GRG has also admitted that it has an open-
ended contract with Garcia for potential future containers of 
UEDs to be sent to Pacifica, but it has made no such shipments to 
date, presumably because of the pendency of litigation. R8. 
The lower court found the likelihood of GRG having further 
dealings with Garcia as purely speculative, and therefore held 
that GRG failed to satisfy the “to be in violation” requirement 
under § 6972(a)(1)(A).  R8.  The lower court cites to Basel Action 
Network v. Maritime Admin., 370 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.D.C. 2005).  In 
Basel, the District Court dismissed an environmental 
organization’s action to bar the Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) from exporting defunct naval vessels containing toxic 
substances to the United Kingdom for disposal.  The action was 
similarly based on § 6972(a)(1)(A).  Because MARAD had stated 
its intent to abide by the statutory obligations for export of 
hazardous waste, the court found that there was no current and 
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ongoing violation.  Basel, 370 F.Supp.2d at 79.  Here, GRG has 
not made any such statement and is therefore distinguishable. 
Violations are ongoing if there is evidence from which a 
reasonable trier of fact could find the likelihood of a recurrence of 
intermittent or sporadic violations when the complaint was filed. 
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 
F.2d 170, 171-72 (4th Cir.1988) (“Gwaltney II”).  “Intermittent or 
sporadic violations do not cease to be ongoing until the date when 
there is no real likelihood of repetition.”  Id.  Here, GRG had an 
open-ended contract with Garcia for future shipments of UEDs, 





1) Initially, this court should question parties as to the 
standard of review applicable in this litigation. 
 
2) For constitutional standing, consider whether: 
a) Injury to Valdez or Ventura was “actual and 
imminent” and “concrete and particularized.” 
i. Does Ventura’s intent to return qualify as “actual 
and imminent”? Even if there has been no physical 
manifestation of his injuries? 
b) Injury was fairly traceable to the actions of the 
defendants. 
i. Were the injuries the result of actions by GRG and 
Newtown PTA in collecting the MyPhones? 
ii. Would Ventura have documented the plight of the 
local Sud-Americano workers even if no MyPhone 
collection had occurred? 
iii. Would Valdez have been injured but for the GRG 
shipment? 
c) The complained-of conduct is redressable by the courts. 
i. Will a favorable decision here remedy the 
environmental degradation at Garcia’s Sud-
Americano operation? 
ii. If not, how do FRT and its members have standing 
without redressability? 
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iii. Would a cessation of GRG and Newtown PTA’s 
efforts to recycle electronics devices lead to a 
healthier city of Pacifica? 
iv. Would such an outcome allow Ventura to return to 
the scene of the toxicity without fear of injury? 
 
3) Is there RCRA statutory standing? 
a) Does a citizen suit under RCRA need to be brought by 
a citizen of the United States, as the district court 
held? 
b) If FRT only has representational standing due to a 
foreign citizen’s injuries, isn’t this de facto 
extraterritorial application of RCRA?  Does the simple 
retention of U.S. counsel defeat the presumption 
against extraterritorial application? 
c) What did the lower court decide as to the interest “the 
entire world has” with respect to enforcing RCRA? 
d) If “person” expressly allows non-citizens such as 
trusts, corporations, and states to sue, why wouldn’t 
this be read to include rights for non-citizens such as 
foreign citizens? 
e) If RCRA grants jurisdiction to Valdez or Ventura, and 
the case is decided against GRG/Newtown, the money 
from any judgment will be paid to the U.S. Treasury: 
would this not mean that the injuries suffered in Sud-
Americano are not redressed and there is no standing 
under RCRA for the present facts? 
f) How does the single shipment of electronics constitute 
an “ongoing violation”? 
g) Does a contract like the one between GRG and Garcia 
establish “ongoing violation”? 
h) Does the location of the injury change the RCRA 
standing analysis? Does the location where GRG 
violated the RCRA have to be the same as the location 
at which the plaintiffs are injured? 
i) Is the protection of workers in Sud-Americano (and 
filmmakers documenting toxic exposure there) within 
the “zone of interest” of RCRA? Should all 
environmental statutes be read to be supportive of 
global environmental protection? 
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ISSUE II: Standing under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
Whether the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) provides an 
alternate basis for FRT’s standing. 
 
A. Positions of the Parties 
Appellees GRG and Newtown PTA argue that the 
ATCA does not apply. 
Appellant FRT argues that it has standing under the 
ATCA. 
Intervenor Appellee EPA argues that FRT does not 
have standing under the ATCA. 
 
B. Discussion 
FRT member Valdez brought a claim under the ATCA on 
grounds that appellees’ tortious actions directly led to the same 
concrete actual injuries discussed in the earlier analysis.  R8.  
FRT argues that international custom and Congressional action 
on the issue supports a claim of jurisdiction under ATCA.  GRG 
and Newtown PTA argue that the court properly dismissed ATCA 
claim.  EPA argues that, as a matter of policy, its regulations are 
sufficient to protect the interests of foreign citizens and that 
expansion of the ATCA in this situation would be an impediment 
to the administrative process. 
The lower court found that Valdez had constitutional 
standing to proceed with his ATCA claim, as the ATCA allows for 
compensatory damages, and therefore he was not hampered by 
the redressability problems associated with the RCRA claim.  R8.  
However the court concluded ATCA did not confer jurisdiction in 
this case because no tort was committed “in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. R8. 
Overview of ATCA 
The ATCA, also known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), was 
enacted in 1789 as a clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789.  In its 
current form it reads, “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
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committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
In order to state an ATCA claim, plaintiffs must (i) be 
“aliens,” (ii) claiming damages for a “tort only,” (iii) resulting from 
a violation “of the law of nations” or of “a treaty of the United 
States.” Id. 
ATCA has not been limited to suits against states but has 
also been successfully applied to suits against multinational 
corporations where they acted under “color of [state] law” or 
committed certain private acts such as piracy and slave trading. 
See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 
F.Supp.2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding cause of action for 
violations of jus cogens norms including genocide); Kadic v. 
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-241 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding cause of 
action for genocide).  See also Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of the Union of 
Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348 (C.D.Cal. 1997) (citing 
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)). 
An issue that has divided courts is whether ATCA permits 
private causes of action for recently identified violations of 
customary international law.  See Abeje-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 
844 (11th Cir. 1996) (recognizing private cause of action under 
ATCA against ex-officials of Ethiopia for torture); Hilao v. Estate 
of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (recognizing private cause of action against former 
President of the Philippines for torture, execution, and 
disappearance); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring that ATCA is purely 
jurisdictional and does not create a private cause of action 
against the Palestinian Labor Organization for torture). 
This issue was recently decided by the Supreme Court in 
Sosa v. Alvarez, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). In Sosa, the plaintiff 
Alvarez, a Mexican national acquitted of murder after being 
abducted and transported to the U.S. to face prosecution, brought 
suit under ATCA and Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against 
the U.S., Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents, former 
Mexican policemen, and Mexican civilians.  Alvarez brought 
claims for false arrest against the U.S. and DEA agents under the 
FTCA, and claims for arbitrary detention against Sosa under 
ATCA for a violation of the law of nations.  Id. at 697.  Alvarez 
23
NELMCC BENCH BRIEF 2010   
868 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27   
argued that ATCA was intended not only as a jurisdictional grant 
but also as authority for the creation of a new cause of action for 
torts in violation of international law.  Id. at 713.  The Supreme 
Court declined to extend ATCA jurisdiction to cover arbitrary 
detention, holding that “the statute is in terms only 
jurisdictional,” but that “at the time of enactment, the jurisdiction 
enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category 
defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.” Id. 
at 712. 
The Supreme Court offered several reasons for ATCA’s 
strictly jurisdictional nature. First, the Court noted the 
placement of the statute in § 9 of the Judiciary Act, a statute 
otherwise exclusively concerned with federal-court jurisdiction. 
Id. at 713.  Second, the Court made several inferences from the 
statute’s history, while acknowledging the difficulty of discerning 
its Congressional intent due to the scant legislative history. The 
Supreme Court reasoned that “Congress did not pass the [ATCA] 
as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by 
a future Congress or state legislature that might, someday, 
authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make 
some element of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of 
foreigners”, and that “Congress intended the [ATCA] to furnish 
jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging 
violations of the law of nations.” Id. at 719.  The Supreme Court 
concluded that “the statute was intended to have practical effect 
the moment it became law,” on the understanding that “the 
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest 
number of international law violations with a potential for 
personal liability at the time.” Id. at 724. 
In Sosa, the Supreme Court limited the category of claims 
that can be brought under ATCA when based on the present-day 
law of nations.  It held that federal courts could recognize a claim 
under the law of nations as an element of common law, but that 
the claim must “rest on a norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms [the 
Court has] recognized.” Id. at 725.  The Court recognized three 
such claims: “a violation of safe conducts, infringement of the 
rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. at 714, 724.  The Court 
went on to state that in determining “whether a norm is 
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sufficiently definite to support a cause of action,” the court must 
consider “the practical consequences of making that cause 
available to litigants in the federal courts, which entails gauging 
the claim against the current state of international law. Id. at 
732.  In the absence of a treaty, controlling executive or 
legislative act, or a controlling judicial decision, the Court 
recommended examining the following sources of international 
law: “the customs and usages of civilized nations; and as evidence 
of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years 
of labor, research and experience, have made themselves 
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.” 
Id. at 734. 
One issue that has remained unanswered is what constitutes 
“a violation of safe conducts.”  Legal scholars have suggested that 
“safe conduct” at the time of ATCA’s enactment encompassed 
both explicit safe conducts granted under the authority of the 
United States (i.e., a passport) and implied safe conducts based 
on either a treaty or a law of nations. Id. at 879.  A safe-conduct 
violation constituted “a noncontract injury to an alien’s person or 
property – an alien tort.” Id.  The ATCA allowed for such injuries 
to be addressed in domestic court for reasons of political 
expedience, in order to “[d]iminish the risk that the offended 
sovereign would exercise its lawful right to make war.”  Id. at 
881.  See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 
782 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
ATCA Application to the Export of Hazardous Waste 
As explained above, ATCA can apply only where the injury 
arises from a violation of the “law of nations” or “a treaty of the 
United States.”  Thus, this section reviews the relevant treaties 
and agreements relating to the export of hazardous waste for the 
purpose of determining the application of ATCA claims for 
injuries arising from the export of hazardous waste. 
There is a large body of international law regulating the 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. The most 
comprehensive global environmental treaty on hazardous and 
other wastes is the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal (“Basel Convention”), Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Environment 
Programme, Agenda Item 3, U.N.E.P. Doc. IG 8013, reprinted in 
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28 I.L.M. 649 (entered into force in 1992).  There are currently 
172 parties to the Convention (2009).  The United States signed 
the Convention in 1990 and the Senate gave its advice and 
consent to ratification in 1992, but it has yet to ratify it. 
The key objectives of the Basel Convention are (1) to reduce 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes to a minimum 
consistent with their environmentally sound management; (2) to 
treat and dispose of hazardous wastes as close as possible to their 
source of generation in an environmentally sound manner; and 
(3) to minimize the generation of hazardous wastes and other 
wastes in terms of quantity and hazardousness. See website of 
the Basel Convention, available at http://basel.int/convention/ 
basics (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). The Convention regulates two 
categories of waste.  The first are “hazardous wastes” which are 
either listed in Annex I of the Convention and display the 
characteristics contained in Annex III, including explosivity, 
flammability, toxicity, and corrosivity; or they are wastes that are 
not listed in Annex I but considered hazardous by domestic 
legislation of the Party of export, import, or transit.  The second 
category of wastes is “other wastes” and includes household 
wastes and residues arising from the incineration of household 
wastes.  Basel Convention, art. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 659. 
The Convention achieves its objectives via three approaches.  
First, the Convention controls the transboundary movement of 
hazardous wastes by establishing a global notification and 
consent regime as well as a tracking system for the 
transboundary shipment of hazardous and other wastes among 
Parties.  Id., art. 4(1)(c), 4(7)(c), and 6(9), 28 I.L.M. at 661, 663, 
665.  Shipments made without prior informed consent are 
considered illegal traffic and criminal.  Id., art. 4(3) and 9(1), 28 
I.L.M. at 662, 666. Second, the Convention requires Parties to 
manage and dispose of waste in an environmentally sound 
manner.  Id., art. 4(2)(b) and (c), 28 I.L.M. at 662, and Parties are 
prohibited from exporting or importing wastes if they have reason 
to believe that it would not comply with environmentally sound 
management (ESM). Id., art. 4(1)(e) and (g), 4(8), 28 I.L.M. at 
662, 663.  Third, the Convention encourages the minimization of 
hazardous waste generation and national self-sufficiency in waste 
management.  Id., art. 4(2)(a) and (b), 28 I.L.M. at 662. Parties 
are required to ensure that shipments are allowed only if (a) the 
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State of export does not have the capacity to dispose of the waste 
in an environmentally sound and efficient manner; or (b) the 
waste is required as a raw material in the State of import; or (c) 
the transboundary movement is consistent with criteria decided 
by the Parties and the objectives of the Convention.  Id., art. 4(9), 
28 I.L.M. at 663. 
The Convention also has an effect on non-Parties.  Parties 
are prohibited from shipping to and from non-Parties, Id., art 
4(5), 28 I.L.M. at 662, unless it is under a bilateral, multilateral, 
or regional agreement that does “not derogate from the 
environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes and 
other wastes as required by [the] Convention.”  Id., art. 11, 28 
I.L.M. 668. The Convention explicitly states that it does not affect 
the transboundary movement of hazardous waste and other 
wastes that take place pursuant to such agreements.  Id. 
In addition to the global regime established by the Basel 
Convention, there are various bilateral and multilateral treaties 
and corresponding national implementing regulations regulating 
the transboundary movements of hazardous waste. The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (then comprised of 24 industrialized nations, including 
the U.S.) paved the way for the Basel Convention by mandating a 
prior notice and consent system for shipments between OECD 
member states. The Decision and Recommendation on 
Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Waste, OECD Doc. C (83) 
180 (Feb. 13, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 214 (1984).  This was 
followed by a requirement of prior notice and consent for 
shipments between OECD member and non-member states and a 
prohibition on exports to non-member states that lack the proper 
disposal facilities. Council Decision-Recommendation on Exports 
of Hazardous Wastes from the OECD Area, OECD Doc. C (86) 64 
(June 5, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1010 (1986).  In 1992, the 
OECD adopted a decision establishing a control system for the 
transfrontier movements among OECD member countries of 
wastes destined for recovery. Council Decision Concerning the 
Control of Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Waste 
Destined for Recovery Operations, Doc. C (92) 39/FINAL (Mar. 
30, 1992) (as amended and replaced by C (2001) 107/Final).  
Other multilateral agreements at the regional level include the 
Bilateral Agreement Between the Government of the United 
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States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning the 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste (1986); the 
Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation Between the United States of 
America and the United Mexican States Regarding the 
Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous 
Substances (1986), 22 I.L.M 1025; North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 
(North America); Regulation (EC) No. 1013/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on shipments of waste, June, 14, 
2006, 2006 O.J. (L 190) (Europe); Bamako Convention on the Ban 
of the Import Into Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, 
Jan. 30, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 (Africa); and the Convention to Ban 
the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and 
Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific 
Region, Oct. 21, 2001, 2161 U.N.T.S. 91 (the South Pacific). 
Many of these agreements and treaties contain similar 
provisions to regulate the transboundary movement of hazardous 
waste.  The most common provisions include the requirements of 
prior informed consent from the importing country and the 
assurance of environmentally sound management.  See generally 
Theodore Waugh, Where do we go from here: Legal Controls and 
Future Strategies for Addressing the Transportation of 
Hazardous Wastes across International Borders, 11 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L.J. 477, 518-519 (2000) (commenting that the 
international agreements governing the transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes indicate a growing interest in 
regulating and restricting hazardous waste trading).  There are 
also significant differences, particularly in the scope of the wastes 
subject to regulation and in the regulation of shipment for 
recovery or recycling.  See, e.g., Bamako Convention (defining 
“hazardous waste” as any waste that is listed in its Annex I 
(similar to Annex I of the Basel Convention) or that possesses any 
hazardous characteristic enumerated in its Annex II (similar to 
the Basel Convention); and banning the import of hazardous 
material into Africa for purposes of disposal and recycling but not 
for purposes of recovery); see generally Kenneth D. Hirschi, 
Possibilities for a Unified International Convention on the 
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Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes, 10 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 169 (1997). 
Analysis of FRT’s Standing under ATCA 
In order to bring a suit under the ATCA, the claimant, in this 
case FRT, must allege a violation of a treaty or law of nations; 
allege a conduct constituting a tort against the person or 
property; bring the case by an alien; and meet all other 
jurisdictional threshold requirements for suits in federal courts, 
including standing. See Lisa T. Belenkey, Cradle to Border: US 
Hazardous Waste Export Regulations and International Law, 17 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 95, 133 (1999). 
GRG and Newtown PTA’s Argument 
GRG and Newtown PTA will argue that this court cannot 
recognize a claim under the ATCA because the U.S. has not 
ratified the Basel Convention and there is no law of nations 
regulating the export of hazardous wastes.  They will argue that 
the existence of the Basel Convention and other treaties do not 
indicate customary international law since the U.S. remains a 
non-party to the Basel Convention and yet generates the largest 
amount of municipal solid waste per person on a daily basis 
among industrialized nations.  See U.S. EPA., 2008 Report on the 
Environment (Final Report) ch. 4.4. 
GRG and Newtown PTA will further argue that plaintiffs do 
not have standing under ATCA because although the injury-in-
fact and redressability requirements may be satisfied, the 
element of causation has not.  They will point to the fact that they 
were not responsible for Garcia’s operations in Sud-Americano, 
the source of plaintiff’s injury. 
FRT’s Argument 
Because the U.S. has not ratified the Basel Convention, FRT 
will argue that the illegal export and dumping of hazardous 
waste in developing countries constitutes a violation of the law of 
nations.  FRT will argue that the existence of international, 
bilateral, and multilateral treaties in addition to domestic 
legislation addressing the transboundary movement of hazardous 
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waste demonstrates the existence of a customary international 
law against the export of hazardous waste without prior informed 
consent or in contradiction to environmentally sound 
management. 
In order to respond to Appellees’ argument that the U.S. 
position on the Basel Convention negates any indication that it 
represents a law of nations, FRT will rely on the District Court 
case of Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, in which the Court held that the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
established customary international law, even though the United 
States had not ratified it. 221 F.Supp.2d 1116 (C.D.Cal. 2002), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 
2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 487 F.3d 1193 
(9th Cir. 2007), hearing en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 
2007), aff’d, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).  In Sarei, the residents 
of Papua New Guinea brought a class action under ATCA against 
an international mining company for environmental destruction, 
harm to human health, and incitement of a civil war.  They based 
their ATCA claim on several theories including violations of 
UNCLOS.  The District Court held that plaintiffs can base an 
ATCA claim on UNCLOS because UNCLOS reflects customary 
international law. Id., at 1162.  The Court reasoned that even 
though the United States has only signed but not ratified the 
treaty, the United States has recognized that the treaty’s baseline 
provisions reflect customary international law.  Id. at 1161 
(quoting U.S. v. State of Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588, n.10 (1992)). 
FRT will not have a strong argument.  Although UNCLOS is 
similar to the Basel Convention in its number of state parties, 
they are distinguishable in the sense that the U.S. Government 
has not publicly recognized the Basel Convention as reflecting 
customary international law.  It has stated instead that “the 
United States voluntarily complies with the provisions of the 
Basel Convention to the extent that they do not conflict with U.S. 
domestic law.” See SYMPOSIUM: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND BUSINESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: Trash or Treasure? 
Industrial Recycling and International Barriers to the Movement 
of Hazardous Wastes, 22 IOWA J. CORP. L. 507, 528 (1997). 
In the alternative, FRT may argue that congressional action 
in response to OECD Decisions regulating the shipments of 
hazardous waste evidence the U.S. recognition of the Basel 
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Convention as customary international law. U.S. exports of 
hazardous wastes for recycling to any of the other OECD nations 
is bound by the OECD Council Decision C (92) 39 “Concerning the 
Control of Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Waste 
Destined for Recovery Operations.” Id. at 525.  EPA has 
acknowledged the Decision’s binding nature, stating that the 
Decision “imposes legally binding commitments on the United 
States pursuant to Articles 5(a) and 6(2) of the OECD 
Convention.” Id.  This conclusion is also supported by EPA’s 
promulgation of regulations implementing the Decision.  Id.  
Accordingly, EPA’s regulations require (1) the export of 
hazardous waste only for purposes of recovery or recycling, except 
in the presence of a bilateral agreement; (2) notification to and 
consent of the importing country; and (3) additional labeling of 
the hazardous waste for export on a tracking document using the 
OECD labeling system: red, amber, green listings.  40 C.F.R. §§ 
262.80-262.89 (1998). 
GRG and Newtown PTA’s Argument 
GRG will argue that the OECD Decision above is limited to 
the transboundary movement of hazardous waste within the 
OECD area and therefore does not equate to compliance with the 
Basel Convention.  Furthermore, it will argue that Article 11 of 
the Basel Convention allows for bilateral and multilateral 
treaties to supersede the Convention.  GRG will argue that the 
U.S. is simply fulfilling its obligation as a signatory, but as its 
domestic legislation indicates, it does not recognize the Basel 
Convention as a customary international law.  EPA’s regulations 
do not regulate wastes that are considered hazardous by other 
OECD members if not considered a RCRA hazardous waste.  40 
C.F.R. § 262.80(a). 
FRT’s Response to EPA’s Argument 
Finally, FRT must counter EPA’s argument that, as a matter 
of policy, EPA’s regulations are sufficient to protect the interests 
of foreign citizens and that expansion of ATCA claims would be 
an impediment to the administrative process. 
FRT may argue that EPA’s regulations in fact do not 
sufficiently protect the interests of foreign citizens, in that EPA’s 
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export requirements do not cover many of the waste regulated 
under the Basel Convention because they are exempt from the 
RCRA hazardous waste regime. For example, household wastes, 
including electronic wastes, are exempted from RCRA’s export 
regulations, while they are regulated under the Basel 
Convention.  Additionally, FRT may point out that the export 
requirements are satisfied once the importing country consents to 
the export, 40 C.F.R. § 262.52, and there are no obligations by the 
exporter to ensure that the importer will manage the waste in an 
environmentally sound manner. For a more detailed explanation, 
see Sections IV and V. 
On the question of whether the ATCA claims would be an 
impediment to the administrative process, the issue is whether 
ATCA requires an exhaustion of national remedies before it may 
be applied.  This question has been answered in the negative, on 
grounds that Congress’ inclusion of an exhaustion of remedies 
provision in the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) was not 
intended to impose a similar requirement on ATCA claims that 
fall outside the scope of the TVPA statute, namely, claims other 
than for torture or summary executions.  See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 





a. What was the congressional intent behind the 
enactment of the ATCA? 
b. Does the ATCA apply to torts committed by private 
actors? 
c. Does the ATCA permit private causes of action for 
recently identified violations of customary 
international law? 
d. What constitutes “a violation of safe conducts”? 
 
2) Does the ATCA confer jurisdiction for torts related to the 
export of hazardous waste? 
a. Is there a law of nations governing the export of 
hazardous waste? 
b. Must the US have signed the Basel Convention in 
order for the Convention to be treated as a law of 
nations? 
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c. What are the implications of US compliance with 
OECD regulations on the export of hazardous waste? 
 
3) ATCA jurisdiction versus standing. 
a. Does jurisdiction under ATCA automatically give one 
standing? 
 
4) Does EPA have a valid argument against ATCA 
jurisdiction? 
a. Are EPA’s regulations sufficient to protect the 
interests of foreign citizens? 
 
5) Must national remedies be exhausted before ATCA may 
be applied? 
 
ISSUE III: Continuing Litigation without an Original Party 
Whether a dismissal of the suit between FRT and GRG and 
Newtown PTA (the original parties) ends the action with respect 
to intervenor EPA’s claims. 
 
A. Positions of the Parties 
Appellees GRG and Newtown PTA argue that 
dismissal of the suit ends the action with respect to 
the intervenor EPA’s claims. 
Appellant FRT argues that dismissal of the suit does 
not end the action with respect to the intervenor 
EPA’s claims. 
 Intervenor-Appellee EPA argues that dismissal of the 
suit does not end the action with respect to the 
intervenor EPA’s claims. 
 
B. Discussion 
The issue here is the procedural effect of Plaintiffs’ lack of 
jurisdiction on the ability of EPA to continue the action.  R10.  
GRG and Newtown PTA argue that dismissal of the original 
action on jurisdictional grounds ends the action with respect to 
EPA’s intervenor claims.  R10.  They argue that because EPA is 
free to bring its own separate civil or criminal enforcement action 
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at any time, EPA should have done so separate from this suit.  
R11, n3. FRT argues EPA’s intervention should continue in the 
interests of justice, in order to allow EPA to enforce RCRA.  R10.  
EPA similarly argues that it has an interest in the potential 
RCRA violations and therefore should be allowed to continue.  
R10. EPA argues that justice would best be served by allowing 
the action to continue with EPA as a party and that EPA has an 
independent, jurisdictional basis for its involvement in the action.  
R2. 
The District Court held that because of EPA’s agency 
authority to enforce RCRA violations, it has sufficient interest, 
basis, and standing to continue the suit in absence of the original 
plaintiffs.  R10-11.  It dismissed the appellees’ argument for the 
need for a separate enforcement suit, on grounds that RCRA, in 
42 U.S.C. § 6972(d), allows the Administrator to intervene in 
whichever citizen suit it likes.  R11, n3.  The Court interpreted 
the broad discretion in this provision to indicate that Congress 
intended to allow EPA to make the decision as to when and where 
to act towards RCRA enforcement. Id.  The Court gave deference 
to the agency’s decision under Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Id. 
Overview of Intervention 
Intervention is authorized under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) Rule 24.  A nonparty may request to intervene 
as of right under Rule 24(a) or seek permissive intervention 
under Rule 24(b).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.  Intervention allows 
nonparties to protect their interests from being impaired by a 
court’s adjudication of a dispute between original parties; 
improves the court’s decision-making by allowing the 
presentation of different viewpoints; and contributes to judicial 
economy. See Karastelev, Note: On the Outside Seeking in: Must 
Intervenors Demonstrate Standing To Join a Lawsuit? 52 DUKE 
L.J. 455 (2002). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit as a 
matter of right under all of the statutes, subject to the conditions 
of FRCP Rule 24(a).  See Loyd, Citizen Suits and Defenses 
Against Them, ALI/ABA Course of Study in Environmental 
Litigation (June 25-28, 2008), SN085 ALI-ABA 847, 872. Under 
FRCP Rule 24(a)(1) governing the procedures for intervention as 
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of right, “on timely motion, the court must permit anyone to 
intervene who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by 
a federal statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the property 
or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated 
that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or 
impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing 
parties adequately represent that interest.” 
In the alternative, the government may seek permissive 
intervention under FRCP Rule 24(b)(2).  Under this provision, “on 
timely motion, the court may permit a federal or state 
governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party’s claim or 
defense is based on: (A) a statute or executive order administered 
by the officer or agency; or (B) any regulation, order, requirement, 
or agreement issued or made under the statute or executive 
order.” 
Intervenor Standing 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly decided whether FRCP 
Rule 24 intervenors require Article III standing.  See Diamond v. 
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69, 69 n.21 (1986) (concluding it need not 
decide today whether an intervenor under Rule 24(a)(2) requires 
Article III standing). Circuit Courts are currently split as to this 
issue owing to disagreement over whether standing is a 
requirement on the court or a requirement on every party. See 
Stradling & Doyle, Notes & Comments: Intervening in the Case 
(or Controversy): Article III Standing, Rule 24 Intervention, and 
the Conflict in the Federal Courts, 2003 B.Y.U.L. REV. 419, 424-
425. Diamond may be interpreted to require standing on the 
court, not on each party.  Id. at 440-42.  In Diamond, private 
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a state abortion law, 
and Diamond, a private physician, intervened on behalf of the 
State. Because the State had decided not to appeal, the Court 
decided that an intervening private citizen must independently 
show Article III standing in order to continue without the original 
plaintiff. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64. 
Intervention after Dismissal of the Original Claim 
The majority of cases have found that the intervenor is 
allowed to continue, despite the dismissal of the action. “The 
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weight of authority in the United States Courts of Appeals 
supports the principle that an intervenor can continue to litigate 
after dismissal of the party who originated the action.” U.S. Steel 
Corp. v. EPA, 614 F.2d 843, 845 (3d Cir. 1979) (allowing private 
non-party to continue intervention in industry challenge of EPA’s 
regulations, in that his interests were related but not identical to 
the industry’s interests and such allowance served both judicial 
economy and prompt disposition of the litigation). 
Analysis of EPA’s Intervenor Claims 
EPA’s Argument 
EPA will argue that it can intervene as of right under FRCP 
Rule 24(a)(1) and RCRA § 7002(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(d), which 
states, “in any action under (section § 6972), the Administrator, if 
not a party, may intervene as a matter of right.”  RCRA § 
7002(b)(1) also grants such authority, stating “in any action 
under subsection (a)(1)(A). . . any person may intervene as a 
matter of right.”  FRCP Rule 24(a)(2) does not apply here because 
it is for when there is no statute directly addressing the right to 
intervene.  See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, Government 
Participation in Private Litigation, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 853, 930 
(1989). 
 GRG and Newtown PTA’s Argument 
GRG and Newtown PTA will argue that the use of “may” in 
the statutory authority to intervene is equivalent to a permissive 
intervention and therefore the court can and should prohibit 
EPA’s intervention. In that appellees’ defense is based on RCRA, 
EPA may intervene under FRCP Rule 24(b)(2)(A).  Appellees will 
argue that the Court has the discretion whether or not to allow 
EPA to intervene.  They may argue that due to the dismissal of 
the original action, EPA’s intervenor claims should not be 
continued. 
The case law is unclear as to whether or not “may” in such 
situations is equivalent to permissive intervention. See 
Greenbaum, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. at 928-930. Cases which have 
interpreted “may” to imply an unconditional right of intervention 
have looked at the provision’s legislative history, see Carter v. 
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Sch. Bd. of W. Feliciana Parish, 569 F. Supp. 568, 571, n295 
(M.D.La. 1983), or at the statutory construction, namely, the 
availability of other provisions in the same statute which 
authorize intervention but use explicit mention of “in [the court]’s 
discretion.”  See Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d 1242 (9th 
Cir. 1969).  Using the same analysis, it can be argued that “may” 
in § 6972(d) refers to intervention as of right because it is not 
conditioned as the “may” in § 6972(b)(2)(E), permitting 
intervention only “when the applicant claims an interest relating 
to the subject of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or 
impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the 
Administrator or the State shows that the applicant’s interest is 
adequately represented by existing parties.”  This interpretation 
is supported by legislative history, which shows Congress chose 
“may” in order to not overburden EPA with oversight 
responsibilities.  See Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Intern. 
Inc., 2007 WL 576343, *6 (D.N.J. 2007). 
The District Court reasoned that the broad discretion to 
intervene under § 6972 indicates Congress’ intent to allow EPA to 
make the decision as to when and where to act towards the 
enforcement of RCRA, and such decision-making should be 
afforded Chevron deference. R11, n3. Affording such deference 
requires a two-step process. “First . . . is whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of 
Congress is clear. . . the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” “If the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984). 
As explained above, the statute is not clear as to whether the 
provision allows EPA to intervene “in whichever suits it likes.” 
 EPA’s Argument 
EPA, in its defense, will argue that courts have generally 
allowed the government to intervene in such circumstances.  See, 
e.g., Blowers v. Lawyers Coop. Publ’g Co., 527 F.2d 333, 334 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (“District courts should not be niggardly in allowing a 
Government agency to intervene in cases involving a statute it is 
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required to enforce; indeed a hospitable attitude is appropriate.”). 
Courts have been more likely to allow intervention where: (1) the 
Government’s interest is particularly strong, see, e.g., Group 
Health, Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass’n, 587 F. Supp. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984); (2) the Government can provide special information or 
expertise which will help the ultimate resolution of the issues, 
see, e.g., In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480, 487 n.5 (5th Cir. 1975); or (3) 
the Government’s presence and position will not overly confuse 
the proceeding or expand its scope, see, e.g. Blowers, 527 F.2d at 
334 (denying intervention), but within the scope of the basic 
lawsuit the government will provide something unique, see e.g., 
Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 359 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying 
intervention). See Greenbaum, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. at 970. EPA will 
argue that all of these factors come into play here, particularly 
the fact that it is has a strong interest in enforcing the statue and 
has special expertise in the management of hazardous waste. 
 GRG and Newtown PTA’s Argument 
GRG and Newtown PTA will also argue that contrary to the 
District Court’s decision, EPA does not have standing to continue 
the litigation and therefore should not be permitted to continue 
without the original parties because the standing requirement 
must be satisfied at all stages of the case.  Burke v. Barnes, 479 
U.S. 361, 362-64 (1987). 
 EPA’s Argument 
EPA will argue that sufficient interest, basis, and standing 
are established by its authority to enforce the laws and by the 
explicit authority to intervene under § 6972(d). 
As stated above, the case law is unclear whether or not EPA 
would require standing to intervene.  However, this case presents 
a situation where the original plaintiffs have been dismissed.  
The District Court cites to Diamond v. Charles to argue that 
intervenors must satisfy Article III Standing. R10.  EPA may 
argue that this case is distinguishable from Diamond in that here 
all parties appealed. The District Court also cites to Ruotolo v. 
Ruotolo for the proposition that in order for a U.S. agency to 
continue litigation the government “must possess some 
independent basis as a party apart from its status as intervenor.” 
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572 F.2d 336, 339 (1st Cir. 1978).  R10.  In Ruotolo, the plaintiff, 
who had originally sought disqualification, dropped his objection 
and withdrew from the case. Id. at 338.  The Court therefore held 
that “there could only be a continuing case or controversy if the 
United States, in its own right, apart from [plaintiff], had 
standing to continue.” Id.  As in Diamond, this case is 
distinguishable because all parties appealed. Nevertheless, 
distinguishing this case from Diamond and Ruotolo are 
immaterial because EPA has standing. 
The District Court properly held that EPA has standing in 
this case on grounds that the RCRA violation falls within the 
direct purview of its agency authority. R10-11. Where Congress 
has explicitly authorized the government to sue, the government 
has an “interest,” and injury-in-fact and prudential concern 
requirements are satisfied. Greenbaum, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. at 909. 
Therefore, regardless of whether FRT remains a party to this 





1) In Rutolo v Ruotolo, the 1st Circuit found that once the 
initial parties had settled their differences, the 
government intervenor needed an independent basis to 
maintain an action (apart from its status as intervenor); 
how does that case apply here? 
 
2) How does EPA’s ability to intervene “as a matter of right” 
impact the analysis as to the continuation of this 
litigation? The ability of EPA to intervene was already 
decided when the District Court allowed the 
intervention—continuation of litigation absent the initial 
plaintiff is an entirely different issue, isn’t it? 
 
3) If this court dismisses FRT as a party and finds that EPA 
must then re-file claims against GRG and Newtown PTA, 
would any res judicata or estoppel issues arise? How 
about any discovery issues? 
 
4) If the basis of this controversy is between FRT and 
GRG/Newtown PTA, and this Court dismisses FRT’s 
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claims, wouldn’t it make logical sense to have EPA re-file 
as a plaintiff? 
 
5) Is this analysis as simple as: RCRA allows EPA to sue at 
any time, and EPA chose now? 
 
6) How is this case distinguishable from Diamond? Does the 
fact that all parties appealed change our analysis under 
relevant case law? 
 
7) If this court finds that the test for continuation should be 
independent basis as laid out in Ruotolo, can there be any 
conclusion other than that the case must go on? How 
could a court have allowed an intervenor to intervene in 
the first place without independent basis for their 
interest in the litigation? 
 
8) Isn’t the point of intervention to “protect the interests” of 
the intervenor? Should this noble purpose be dropped due 
to jurisdictional/standing miscalculations by another 
party? 
 
ISSUE IV: Solid Waste and RCRA Liability 
Whether the lower court properly analyzed the facts in terms 
of the solid waste nature of the exported materials, and, whether 
the export of container #VS2078 in the manner described subjects 
GRG and Newtown PTA to RCRA liability. 
 
A. Positions of the Parties 
 
Appellees GRG and Newtown PTA argue that RCRA 
does not apply to their exported waste. 
Appellant FRT argues that RCRA applies to the 
exported waste. 
Intervenor-Appellee EPA argues that RCRA applies to 
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GRG and Newtown PTA argue that they are not liable under 
RCRA because their goods ceased to be “solid waste” once they 
were sent outside the United States for recycling.  R2. Both FRT 
and EPA argue that the exported wastes do qualify as “solid 
waste” and therefore appellees are subject to RCRA liability. 
The District Court found that when the citizens of New 
Union gave their UEDs to the appellees, they were disposing of 
those devices, and therefore the materials qualified as solid waste 
under EPA definition. R11.  The Court held that the materials in 
appellees’ container #VS2078 were solid waste under RCRA 
jurisdiction while the container was in the United States.  R12.  
However, once the materials left the United States, the materials 
were neither solid waste nor hazardous waste for purposes of 
RCRA applicability to Garcia’s operations.  R11-12. 
The issues before this court are whether the exported waste 
is in fact ‘solid waste’ as defined in RCRA and whether Appellees’ 
export was subject to RCRA liability. 
Overview of RCRA Definition of ‘Solid Waste’ and 
Exceptions 
RCRA regulates the disposal of solid waste, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 
et seq. (1998), for purposes of “promot[ing] the protection of 
health and the environment and [conserving] valuable material 
and energy resources.” Id. at § 6902(a).  The statute establishes 
four environmental programs, each governed by a different 
subtitle – specifically, hazardous waste management (Subtitle C) 
and solid waste management (Subtitle D).  In order to be 
regulated under RCRA, the waste must satisfy the statutory 
definition of “solid waste.” 
The statutory definition of solid waste is broader than the 
regulatory definition.  EPA regulations define solid waste as 
‘discarded material’ not otherwise excluded.  40 C.F.R. § 
261.2(a)(1).  R11. “Discarded material” is material that is 
“abandoned,” “recycled,” “inherently waste-like,” or “a military 
munition.” 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(2)(i).  R11. In contrast, the statutory 
definition contains the concept of “discarded material” but it does 
not contain the terms “abandoned” or “disposed of” as required by 
the regulatory definition. Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. 
Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1316 (2d Cir. 1993). RCRA 
41
NELMCC BENCH BRIEF 2010   
886 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27   
defines solid waste as “any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste 
treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution 
control facility and other discarded material, including solid, 
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from 
industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and 
from community activities,” with some exclusions.  RCRA § 
1004(27). 
This difference can affect the reach of citizen suits.  A citizen 
suit brought under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(1)(A), to enforce EPA’s hazardous waste regulations must 
use the regulatory definition of solid waste according to 40 C.F.R. 
§ 261.1(b)(1); however, citizen suits brought under § 
7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), to abate an “imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment” may 
use the broader statutory definition. See Conn. Coastal 
Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1315 (holding spent lead shot to 
be a solid waste under the statutory definition but not under the 
regulatory definition, and therefore allowing citizen suit under 
RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) for abatement of an imminent or 
substantial endangerment from solid waste but not for 
enforcement under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A) against the treatment, 
storage, or disposal of the same material without a RCRA 
permit). 
Unlike the statutory definition, the regulations detail which 
solid wastes remain solid wastes when reused or recycled.  See 40 
C.F.R. §§ 261.2, 261.4. Material is “abandoned” if it is “disposed 
of; or burned or incinerated; or accumulated, stored, or treated 
(but not recycled) before or in lieu of being disposed of, burned, or 
incinerated.”  40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b).  A material is “recycled” if it is 
“used, reused, or reclaimed.”  40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(7).  Specifically, 
a material is “recycled” if “used in a manner constituting 
disposal”; “burning for energy recovery”; “reclaimed”; or 
“accumulated speculatively.” 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c).  However, 
materials are not solid wastes when recycled when “used or 
reused as ingredients in an industrial process to make a product, 
provided the materials are not being reclaimed; or used or reused 
as effective substitutes for commercial products; or returned to 
the original process from which they are generated, without first 
being reclaimed or land disposed.”  40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e). 
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Analysis of whether Appellees’ Exported Materials are 
‘Solid Waste’ 
GRG and Newtown PTA’s Argument 
GRG and Newtown PTA may argue that their materials are 
not solid wastes while in the US because they are “recycled.”  
Because a material must be ‘discarded’ in order to be ‘solid waste,’ 
they will argue that their export for sale to foreign salvagers and 
recyclers for purposes of reuse or reclamation of heavy metals and 
other valuable materials constitutes recycling.  In particular, they 
will argue that the exported materials do not qualify as “used or 
reused” because “distinct components of the material are 
recovered as separate end products.”  In the alternative, they will 
argue that their activities qualify for the exemption for “used or 
reused as effective substitutes for commercial products.”  40 
C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(ii).  They will insist that their interpretation is 
consistent with the purpose of RCRA, which is “to conserve 
valuable material and energy resources.”  42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a).  
They will argue that such objectives would not be achieved by 
subjecting their legitimate recycling activities to onerous 
regulations pertaining to the disposal of waste. 
 FRT and EPA’s Argument 
FRT and EPA will argue that the ‘recycling’ exemption does 
not apply to the Appellees’ activities.  They will argue that it is 
precisely their kind of dangerous recycling activity that RCRA 
sought to regulate in order “to promote the protection of health 
and the environment.” Id.  They will point out that the statute 
seeks to minimize the generation of hazardous waste and the 
land disposal of hazardous waste “by encouraging process 
substitution, materials recovery, properly (emphasis added) 
conducted recycling and reuse, and treatment.”  Id. at § 6972 
(a)(6).  They will argue that Appellees’ materials satisfy the 
definition of ‘reclaimed,” which includes materials “processed to 
recover a usable product, or if it is regenerated.  Examples are 
recovery of lead values from spent batteries and regeneration of 
spent solvents.” 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(7).” 
Case law supports the positions of FRT and EPA.  In order 
for the exemption in 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(1)(ii) to apply, “the 
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material must not first be “reclaimed” (processed to recover a 
usable product or regenerated).” Am. Mining Cong. v. E.P.A., 824 
F.2d 1177, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  The materials which are sent 
for reclamation of heavy metals and other valuable materials are 
therefore “solid waste” for RCRA purposes. 
The same analysis does not apply to the still useable UEDs, 
which are sold in the Sud-Americano market or donated to local 
schools.  In American Mining Congress, the Court of Appeals 
determined that “Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed 
its intent that ‘solid waste’ (and therefore EPA’s regulatory 
authority) be limited to materials that are ‘discarded’ by virtue of 
being disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away.” Am. Mining 
Cong., 824 F.2d at 1193.  This conclusion was based on 
considerations of the language and structure of RCRA and 
Congress’ objective in enacting RCRA, namely “to help States 
deal with the ever-increasing problem of solid waste disposal.” Id. 
at 1185.  The Court ultimately held that byproducts of an ongoing 
industrial process are not solid waste when reused in that process 
because “these materials have not yet become part of the waste 
disposal problem.” Based on this analysis, the useable UEDs 
should not be classified as ‘solid waste.’ Where the useable UEDs 
are used as intended and not discarded, they are not to be 
classified as ‘solid waste’ for RCRA purposes.  See Otay Land Co. 
v. U.E. Ltd., L.P., 440 F.Supp.2d 1152 (S.D.Cal. 2006) (holding 
clay target debris and lead shot from ammunition used as 
intended at a shooting range is not discarded and therefore not 
“solid waste” under RCRA). 
Overview of RCRA Export Requirements 
RCRA imposes procedural requirements for the export of 
hazardous waste.  See RCRA § 3017, 42 U.S.C. § 6938 and 40 
C.F.R. § 262.50-58.  Prior to the scheduled export, the primary 
exporter must notify EPA Administrator with information 
including “the types and estimated quantities of hazardous waste 
to be exported,” “the ports of entry,” “a description of the manner 
in which such hazardous waste will be transported to and 
treated, stored, or disposed in the receiving country,” and “the 
name and address of the ultimate treatment, storage, or disposal 
facility.”  42 U.S.C. § 6938(c).  Within 30 days of receipt of such 
notification, the Secretary of State acting on behalf of the 
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Administrator must “forward a copy of the notification to the 
government of the receiving country” and request written consent 
for the importation of waste.  Id. at § 6938(d). The Secretary of 
State must forward the receiving country’s written consent or 
objection to the exporter within 30 days of its receipt.  Id. at § 
6938(e).  At the time of export, the exporter must attach a copy of 
the receiving country’s consent to the manifest accompanying 
each waste shipment, and the shipment must conform to the 
terms of the consent.  Id. at § 6938(a).  Where there is a special 
international agreement between the United States and the 
receiving country establishing notice, export, and enforcement 
procedures, the export need only conform to the terms of the 
agreement.  Id. at § 6938(f). 
These export regulations do not apply to the export of RCRA-
exempt hazardous waste.  (See Section V for an analysis on 
hazardous waste exemptions).  In order for the export regulations 
to apply, the waste must be a hazardous waste under RCRA and 
subject to Federal RCRA manifesting procedures or to Federal (or 
State equivalent) universal waste management standards under 
Part 273.  See EPA Guide to the Imports and Exports of 
Hazardous Waste, Ch. 4, Sec. B, available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
waste/hazard/international/guide2.htm.  Materials that are not 
defined as solid wastes or hazardous wastes are not subject to the 
export regulations.  This includes domestically generated 
household wastes, as long as “the waste is generated by 
individuals on the premises of a temporary or permanent 
residence for individuals; and the waste stream is composed 
primarily of materials found in the wastes generated by 
consumers in their homes (§ 261.4(b)(1)).” Id. at Ch. 4, Sec. D. 
Overview of Extraterritorial Application of RCRA 
Extraterritorial application of domestic law consists of a 
country’s application of its laws and regulations to activities 
outside its territory.  There is a presumption in the United States 
against the extraterritorial application of statutes.  Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244, 248 (1991).  The presumption is based on the 
assumption that Congress legislates primarily to address 
domestic concerns and seeks to avoid infringement upon foreign 
sovereignty.  See Lauren Levy, Stretching Environmental 
45
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Statutes to Include Private Causes of Action And Extraterritorial 
Application: Can It Be Done?, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 65, 
87.  However, courts have indicated three general categories of 
cases where this presumption does not apply: where “there is an 
‘affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed’ to extend 
the scope of the statute to conduct occurring within other 
sovereign nations”; “where the failure to extend the scope of the 
statute to a foreign setting will result in adverse effects within 
the United States”; and “when the conduct regulated by the 
government occurs within the United States.”  Envtl. Def. Fund, 
Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C.Cir. 1993). 
Courts have consistently held that RCRA does not apply 
extraterritorially.  See Amlon Metals, Inc., v. FMC Corp., 775 
F.Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (dismissing citizen suit on grounds 
that that RCRA’s citizen suit provision for “imminent and 
substantial endangerment,” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), does not 
apply to hazardous waste located overseas).  The Amlon Court 
found “considerable legislative history supporting the view that 
Congress intended an entirely domestic focus for RCRA’s citizen 
suit provision.”  Id. at 674, n.8. RCRA liability has been called a 
cradle-to-border liability, as opposed to cradle-to-grave liability, 
owing to the fact that the hazardous waste generator can avoid 
RCRA export restrictions and liability by exporting at the stage 
when the waste is exempt as a hazardous waste. See generally 
Lisa T. Belenkey, Cradle to Border: US Hazardous Waste Export 
Regulations and International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 95 
(1999). 
Analysis of whether Appellees’ Export was Subject to 
RCRA Liability 
GRG and Newtown PTA’s Argument 
GRG and Newtown PTA will argue that the export 
requirements under RCRA § 3017, 42 U.S.C. § 6938, did not apply 
to their shipment because the container did not contain 
hazardous waste.  They will argue that shipments of RCRA-
exempt hazardous waste are not subject to hazardous waste 
export restrictions under § 3017. (The validity of this argument 
will be examined in Section V). GRG and Newtown PTA will 
argue that the § 3017 requirements clearly indicate that they do 
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not apply to RCRA-exempt hazardous waste.  They will point to 
the fact that § 3017 requires a manifest to accompany each 
shipment, Id. at § 6938(a)(1)(C), and the Secretary of State must 
“forward to the receiving country a description of the Federal 
regulations which would apply to the treatment, storage, and 
disposal of the hazardous waste in the United States.” Id. at § 
6938(d).  They will argue that because these requirements cannot 
be fulfilled in the case of the exempted wastes, § 3017 
requirements do not apply.  In fact, EPA made a similar 
argument during the public comment period when it promulgated 
regulations for § 3017 in 1986.  51 Fed. Reg. 28,670 (1986).  See 
Belenkey, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. at 109. 
On the issue of whether RCRA applies extraterritorially, 
GRG and Newtown PTA will argue that RCRA liability does not 
apply to their export activities because RCRA does not apply 
extraterritorially. 
FRT and EPA’s Argument 
FRT and EPA will argue that GRG and Newtown PTA 
violated the export requirements under RCRA § 3017. They will 
point to the fact that no other paperwork, aside from customs 
documents, was used by GRG in the international shipment of 
the container to Sud-Americano. R5. 
If the Court determines that the exported materials are 
RCRA-exempt hazardous waste, FRT and EPA may argue that § 
3017 requirements should still apply to all waste subject to RCRA 
hazardous waste regulations, including those that are specifically 
exempt.  They will argue that these exemptions were instituted to 
promote responsible recycling and recovery operations, see 
Belenkey, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. at 107, and that without 
compliance with the § 3017 requirements there is no guarantee 
that such purposes will be furthered overseas. They will argue 
that their interpretation is more consistent with the statute’s 
objective of promoting “the protection of health and the 
environment” as well as with the Basel Convention, which 
includes household wastes among “other wastes,” Basel 
Convention, art. 1(2), 28 I.L.M. 649, and includes wastes exported 
for “recycling/reclamation of metals and metal compounds” among 
the regulated disposal operations. Id., art. 2(4) and Annex IV. 
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On the issue of the extraterritorial application of RCRA, FRT 
and EPA will argue that the alleged RCRA violation occurred 
domestically and therefore the issue of extraterritoriality does not 
apply.  Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 
(D.C.Cir. 1993). FRT and EPA may also argue that the Amlon 
court was in error and that Congress intended RCRA to apply 
extraterritorially. If the presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of laws is in part based on a desire to avoid 
international friction by infringing upon foreign sovereignty, then 
ensuring that one’s own waste is regulated properly overseas so 





1) Whether the exported waste is RCRA “solid waste.” 
i. What is the difference between the statutory and 
regulatory definitions of “solid waste”? 
ii. Does the above distinction have any effect on this case? 
iii. Does it matter whether a material is disposed for 
recycling purposes? 
iv. Do any of the solid waste exceptions apply to the 
exported materials? 
 
2) Whether Appellees’ export was subject to RCRA liability. 
i. How does EPA regulate the export of waste? 
ii. Do the export requirements apply to waste that is 
exempted as either a solid waste or hazardous waste? 
 
3) Extraterritorial Application of RCRA. 
i. What is the rationale behind extraterritorial 
application? 
ii. Does RCRA allow for extraterritorial application? Why 
or why not? 
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ISSUE V: Hazardous Waste and RCRA Liability 
Whether the materials exported are considered hazardous for 
the purposes of RCRA; and, therefore, whether GRG and 
Newtown PTA are liable for violating the testing and reporting 
provisions of RCRA’s hazardous waste sections. 
 
A. Positions of the Parties 
 
Appellee GRG and Newtown PTA argue that the 
materials in container #VS2078 are not hazardous 
under RCRA. 
Appellant FRT argues that the materials are 
hazardous under RCRA. 
 Intervenor-Appellee EPA argues that the materials 




FRT and EPA argue that appellees’ materials are hazardous.  
Although the materials in the container are no longer available 
for testing, plaintiffs argue that the UEDs meet the toxicity test 
because UEDs such as the MyPhone have routinely been found to 
fail the toxicity test.  R12.  Plaintiffs also argue that appellees, as 
generators of solid waste, were required to determine whether 
their wastes are hazardous, and the failure to do so is a criminal 
offense under 40 C.F.R. § 262.11. R12.  In defense of its 
designation of the appellees as a generator, EPA argues that it is 
bringing an enforcement action under similar circumstances, In 
the matter of EarthEcycle, LLC, EPA Docket No. RCRA-HQ-
2009-0001, and the Court should therefore defer to its 
interpretation.  R12.  Finally, plaintiffs argue that the presence of 
three laptops in the container with a label indicating former 
property of the U.S. Government as well as the presence of 
MyPhones in the container with their original packaging defeats 
the appellees’ reliance on the household waste exemption.  R13. 
GRG and Newtown PTA argue that its wastes qualify as 
household wastes, which are exempted from the hazardous waste 
classification under 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1). 
49
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The District Court declined to find that appellees’ materials 
failed the toxicity test based on circumstantial evidence.  R12.  
Furthermore, the Court did not find GRG in violation of 
determination requirements because it was merely a collector, not 
a generator of solid waste.  R12.  It dismissed EPA’s argument for 
deference on grounds that it was merely a litigation position.  The 
Court also agreed with the appellees that its wastes qualified for 
the household waste exemption, particularly in light of their 
considerable care to ensure that the UEDs derived from 
households.  R13.  The Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument 
that the presence of three laptops defeated the household waste 
exemption, on grounds that there was no evidence that they came 
directly from the government and that the appellees’ precautions 
were sufficient to prevent such anomalies from changing the 
character of the whole container to non-household waste.  The 
Court also dismissed plaintiffs’ argument that the presence of the 
MyPhones in their original packaging defeated the household 
waste exemption, on grounds that the appellees exercised 
diligence in excluding non-household items.  R13. it was sufficient 
that these items had been purchased or acquired for its utility as 
a household item.  R13. 
The issues before this court are whether appellees’ exported 
materials are hazardous and whether plaintiffs violated the 
testing and reporting provisions of RCRA. 
Overview of RCRA “Hazardous” Waste Classification 
Hazardous waste is regulated by Subtitle C of RCRA, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6939b.  The statutory definition of “hazardous 
waste” is “a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which 
because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or 
infectious characteristics may— (A) cause, or significantly 
contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious 
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a 
substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the 
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or 
disposed of, or otherwise managed.”  RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 
6903(5). Congress charged EPA with “identifying the 
characteristics of hazardous waste and listing particular 
hazardous wastes within the meaning of Section 1004(5).”  Id. at 
§ 3001(b)(1). 
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In order to determine whether a material is a “hazardous 
waste,” it must first be determined whether the material is a 
“solid waste,” and if so, whether it is hazardous under criteria 
established by EPA.  R11.  After determining that a waste is 
“solid waste,” the person or persons responsible for the waste 
must determine if any solid or hazardous waste exclusions apply.  
If no exclusions apply, then one looks at whether the waste 
exhibits a hazardous waste characteristic or fits into EPA’s 
category of listed hazardous wastes, 40 C.F.R. Part 261.  The four 
established characteristics are ignitability, § 261.21; corrosivity, § 
261.22; reactivity, § 261.23; and toxicity, § 261.24.  There are 
hundreds of listed hazardous wastes, §§ 261.31-33. 
A solid waste which exhibits either a hazardous waste 
characteristic or constitutes a listed waste may still be excluded 
from the regulatory scheme. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b). The 
exemptions that are relevant for this case are the Conditionally 
Exempt Small Quantity Generator (CESQG) exception, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 261.5, and the household waste exclusion, RCRA § 3001(i) and 
40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1).  The CESQG exception exempts from 
hazardous waste regulation all generators of less than 1kg of 
acute hazardous waste and 100kg of hazardous waste in a 
calendar month.  CESQGs are not subject to substantial 
hazardous waste regulation provided the waste is in compliance 
with the standards in 40 C.F.R. § 261.5(e)-(j).  The household 
waste regulatory exemption is replicated in full below: 
(1) Household waste, including household waste that has 
been collected, transported, stored, treated, disposed, 
recovered (e.g., refuse-derived fuel) or reused. “Household 
waste” means any material (including garbage, trash and 
sanitary wastes in septic tanks) derived from households 
(including single and multiple residences, hotels and 
motels, bunkhouses, ranger stations, crew quarters, 
campgrounds, picnic grounds and day-use recreation 
areas). A resource recovery facility managing municipal 
solid waste shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, 
disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes for 
the purposes of regulation under this subtitle, if such 
facility: 
(i) Receives and burns only 
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(A) Household waste (from single and multiple 
dwellings, hotels, motels, and other residential 
sources) and 
(B) Solid waste from commercial or industrial 
sources that does not contain hazardous waste; and 
(ii) Such facility does not accept hazardous wastes and 
the owner or operator of such facility has established 
contractual requirements or other appropriate 
notification or inspection procedures to assure that 
hazardous wastes are not received at or burned in such 
facility. 
EPA regulations also provide special requirements for 
“recyclable” hazardous wastes.  40 C.F.R. § 261.6.  In general, 
hazardous wastes that are recycled are subject to the 
requirements for generators, transporters, and storage facilities 
under § 261.6(b) and (c).  Under § 261.6(b), “generators and 
transporters of recyclable materials are subject to the applicable 
requirements of parts 262 (generators) and 263 (transporters) of 
this chapter and the notification requirements under section 3010 
of RCRA, except as provided in paragraph (a) of this section.”  
One such exception that may be applicable to this case is § 
261.6(a)(2)(iii), which states,  “recyclable materials from which 
precious metals are reclaimed (40 C.F.R. part 266, subpart F).”  
However, this provision only applies to the reclamation of 
“economically significant amounts of gold, silver, platinum, 
palladium, iridium, osmium, rhodium, ruthenium, or any 
combination of these.” Id. § 266.70 (emphasis added). Another 
exception applies to “recyclable materials used in a manner 
constituting disposal,” § 261.6(a)(2), referring to wastes such as 
fertilizer that are applied to or placed on land. See United States 
v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1361, 1364-65 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(limiting the exception to products made for the general public’s 
use, used in a manner that constitutes disposal, and legitimately 
made out of recyclable hazardous wastes). 
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Analysis of Whether Exported Materials are “Hazardous” 
GRG and Newtown PTA’s Argument 
GRG and Newtown PTA will argue that, if the exported 
materials are deemed to be “solid waste,” those materials qualify 
for the household waste exclusion under RCRA § 3001(i) and 40 
C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1), because all of the UEDs came directly from 
households.  They will claim that Newtown PTA members had 
placed the UEDs in the container only after a visual examination 
showed that they were intact, and only after the residents signed 
a form acknowledging that they came from the household and 
were intact.  R5.  They will argue that it does not matter that 
some items originally came from EPA, because the regulation 
only requires that the material be “derived from households.”  
They will also argue that their activities are covered by the 
exclusion because they were engaged in the collection, 
transportation, and reuse of household waste.  They will argue 
that their operations do not constitute a resource recovery facility 
managing municipal solid waste and therefore they do not have to 
meet the requirements of § 261.4(b)(1)(i) and (ii).  However, were 
FRT or EPA to successfully argue that appellees qualify as a 
resource recovery facility, appellees can claim that they have 
satisfied those requirements. 
FRT and EPA’s Argument 
FRT and EPA will argue that appellees’ exported materials 
do not qualify for the household waste exclusion because 
excluding all electronic waste from the hazardous waste 
classification is inconsistent with Congress’ intent behind the 
exclusion.  They will argue that the exclusion was based on a 
practical necessity but also premised on the understanding that 
the toxicity of household waste would be minimal.  This is implied 
from the various regulations and statements by EPA defining the 
scope of the exclusion. See § 261.4(b)(1)(i) and (ii); Chicago v. 
Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 342, n.3 (1994)(quoting statement 
by EPA in 45 Fed. Reg. 33099 (1980), that the mixing of 
household waste with hazardous waste produced by a generator 
larger than a small quantity generator qualifies as a hazardous 
waste).   
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FRT and EPA will argue that although specific tests have not 
been performed on MyPhones, MyPhones will display a toxicity 
characteristic (TC) if tested by the commonly used Toxicity 
Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP). Appellants will argue 
that a government –sponsored comprehensive testing of other 
models of cell phones has already shown the concentration of lead 
in leachate to exceed the TC limit for lead.  See RCRA Toxicity 
Characterization of Computer CPUs and Other Discarded 
Electronic Devices, Section 4.8. (July 15, 2004) (finding the 
leaching results for more than half of the cell phones tested to 
exceed the TC limit). In light of the toxicity characteristics of cell 
phones and electronic devices in general and their rapid increase 
in recent years, they will argue that RCRA’s purpose can only be 
served by excluding electronic waste from household waste.  
Because Congress delegated to EPA the task of identifying what 
is hazardous, RCRA § 3001, the Court should defer to EPA’s 
interpretation. 
GRG and Newtown PTA’s Response 
GRG and Newtown PTA will argue that where congressional 
intent to exclude household waste is clear from the language of 
the statute, the court need not defer to EPA’s interpretation. 
Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S .at 338-339.  They will also 
argue that waste containing toxic materials is deemed hazardous 
only if they leach toxic chemicals at concentrations dangerous to 
public health, 40 C.F.R. § 261.24, but their exported materials 
were intact and contained the waste well enough to avoid danger 
to public health. 
Overview of RCRA Testing and Reporting Provisions for 
Hazardous Waste 
Hazardous waste is managed from its generation to its 
disposal, a system which is often called a ‘cradle to grave’ 
regulatory scheme.  Subtitle C of RCRA establishes the 
requirements for generators, transporters, and Treatment, 
Storage, and Disposal facilities (TSDFs) that handle hazardous 
waste. 
Generator means, “Any person, by site, whose act or process 
produces hazardous waste identified or listed in part 261 of this 
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chapter or whose act first causes a hazardous waste to become 
subject to regulation.” See RCRA § 3002 and 40 C.F.R. § 260.10.  
Generators are regulated differently depending on the amount of 
waste generated, and small quantity generators, producing less 
than 1000kg/month of waste, are subject to lesser requirements.  
§ 3001(d).  Generators are required to determine the 
hazardousness of their waste by determining first whether “the 
waste is excluded from regulation under 40 C.F.R. 261.4” and 
then whether the waste is a listed hazardous waste or a 
characteristic waste.  40 C.F.R. § 262.11. 
Transporter means “a person engaged in the offsite 
transportation of hazardous waste by air, rail, highway, or 
water.” See RCRA § 3003 and 40 C.F.R. § 260.10.  Transporters 
are regulated under RCRA § 3003, in coordination with 
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations under the 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 
(HMTA).  The regulations set forth various requirements, most 
important of which is compliance with the manifest system and 
the transportation of hazardous waste to a designated TSDF.  
The manifest is a form prepared by the generator for each 
shipment, and it serves as the paper trail linking the generator, 
transporter and TSDF for every shipment of hazardous waste off-
site.  The transporter may not accept for shipment any waste that 
is not accompanied by a manifest. 
Finally, owners and operators of Treatment, Storage, and 
Disposal facilities are regulated under § 3004 and C.F.R. Parts 
264 and 265.  TSDfs must obtain a permit in order to operate and 
abide by recordkeeping and reporting requirements; compliance 
with the manifest system; location, design, and construction 
standards; emergency and contingency plans; financial 
responsibility standards; and facility permit standards. 
Analysis of Violation of Testing and Reporting Provisions 
GRG and Newtown PTA’s Argument 
GRG and Newtown PTA will argue that they have no 
obligation to test the exported materials nor to report to EPA 
regarding their export, as required under 40 C.F.R. § 262.55 
(exception report) and § 262.56 (annual report), because the 
exported materials are not hazardous.  Appellees will rely on the 
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household waste exclusion and/or the conditionally exempt small 
quantity generator exception, explained above. 
FRT and EPA’s Argument 
FRT and EPA will argue that appellees’ failure to test the 
toxicity of their exported materials amounts to a criminal offense.  
R12.  They will point out that under 40 C.F.R. § 262.11, 
generators of hazardous waste are required to determine if their 
wastes are hazardous.  The failure to do so is a criminal offense 
under RCRA § 3008(d), and ignorance of the law is not an excuse. 
See United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that defendants’ awareness that substances were 
hazardous chemicals and waste are sufficient to assign criminal 
liability for violating a statute which requires knowing violation 
of RCRA).  FRT and EPA may also point out that even if 
appellees are more appropriately categorized as transporters, 
because of their role in collecting the waste from the households 
and exporting them overseas, GRG and Newtown PTA are still 
subject to the generator’s requirements because appellees are 
mixing hazardous wastes of different DOT shipping descriptions 
by placing them into a single container. 40 C.F.R. § 263.10(c)(2). 
Appellees are correct that the testing and reporting 
provisions only apply to substances categorized as hazardous, and 
there is no such regulation for the handling of solid waste. If the 
household waste exclusion applies and the exported materials are 
deemed to not be hazardous waste, then no testing or reporting 
provisions apply 
The Court need not defer to EPA’s interpretation as applied 
in its ongoing enforcement action, In the matter of EarthEcycle, 
LLC, because the language of the regulation is unambiguous.  See 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (holding that an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to 
substantial deference, even when the interpretation is adopted as 
a litigation position, so long as it represents the agency’s “fair and 
considered judgment” rather than a position that is merely 
convenient in a given dispute).  See also Christensen v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (holding that no deference is 
due under Auer where the underlying regulation is 
unambiguous). 
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C. Questions 
 
1) Whether appellees’ exported materials are hazardous 
i. Do appellees’ exported materials fall under any of the 
exemptions? (Consider: Household waste, 
Conditionally Exempt Small Quantity Generators, or 
Recyclables) 
ii. Is the household waste exclusion defeated by the 
inclusion of some non-household items? 
iii. Does the presence of original packaging, indicating 
non-use, defeat the exclusion? 
iv. Does appellees’ diligence in excluding non-household 
items mitigate the occasional presence of non-
household items? 
v. Would congressional intent favor exclusion or inclusion 
of electronic waste as a hazardous waste? 
 
2) Testing and Reporting requirements 
i. How should the appellees be classified under the 
regulations? As a Generator; Transporter; Treatment, 
Storage and Disposal facility? 
ii. Does the mixture rule subject the appellants to the 
testing and reporting requirements of a transporter?  
See 40 C.F.R. § 263.10(c)(2) 
iii. Where a hazardous waste generator or transporter 
misinterprets the exclusions and mistakenly believes 
that they were not subject to the hazardous waste 
regulations, what are the consequences? 
iv. Do these requirements apply to RCRA-exempt 
hazardous waste? 
 
3) What deference must the court show to EPA’s litigation 
position? 
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